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Sex Offender Regulations and the Rule of
Law: When Civil Regulatory Schemes
Circumvent the Constitution
by RYAN W. PORTE*
Introduction
Sexual offenses are among the most heinous crimes one person can inflict
upon another. Often, the victim is traumatized for the rest of his or her life and
the offender, when found guilty, faces incarceration and life-altering sex
offender registration requirements. As humans, our hearts and our sympathy
naturally go out to the victims. Admittedly, it is hard to feel much sympathy
for sex offenders. However, as a society based on the rule of law, we need to
ensure that we are punishing offenders and regulating the post-incarceration
activities of this group of individuals within constitutional limits.
Legislatures across the United States are recognizing that decades of
increasingly punitive criminal justice policies have resulted in extraordinary
monetary costs, and severe collateral consequences for convicted individuals
and their communities.' While some states have decided to release certain
classes of criminals from correctional institutions and expand rehabilitation
programs, all states have uniformly taken the opposite stance towards
persons found guilty of sex crimes.2 As one scholar noted, "even as we
reduce sentencing for drug, firearm possession, and other crimes, sex
offender laws in the United States continue to expand and become more
* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am
immensely grateful for the support and assistance of David Faigman, Chancellor & Dean and John F.
Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Press Release, The White House, CEA Report: Economic Perspectives on Incarceration
and the Criminal Justice System (Apr. 23, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/04/23/cea-report-economic-perspect ives-incarceration-and-criminal-justice.
2. Jazmine Ulloa, I Took Someone's Life-Now Iam Giving Back': In California's Prisons,
Inmates Teach Each Other How to Start Over, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), www.latimes.com/
politics/la-pol-sac-prop-57-prison-programs-20170420-htmlstory.html.
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severe."3 As the general public's awareness of sex crimes committed in
universities, the military, and against women and children grows,
legislatures have dramatically increased the incarceration penalties for sex
offenses as well as the post-incarceration regulations once released.4
Noting that the penalties for sex crimes have become more severe, we
need to ensure that all laws are subject to constitutional limits. When a person
is convicted and sent to prison, liberty is removed, yet many constitutional
rights, such as due process, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, ex
post facto5 laws, and double jeopardy remain.6 When a convicted person is
given probation or released on supervised release, his or her criminal
constitutional protections are retained because these post-incarceration
schemes are intended to remain punitive. In contrast, when an individual is
adjudicated as a sex offender, once the offender is released, similar
constitutional rights other classes of criminals enjoy often do not apply.
The constitutionality of post-incarceration sex offender regulations
hinges on whether or not the regulations were enacted under civil law as a
non-punitive measure for the protection of the populace, or were imposed as
a punitive measure.8 If the regulatory program is found to be punitive, then
the inquiry ends, and the constitutional protections noted above apply. if
the program is found to be nonpunitive for a public purpose, then the
regulatory scheme can ignore criminal constitutional considerations.0
The United States Supreme Court first addressed constitutional
challenges to sex offender regulation statutes in Kansas v. Hendricks and
3. See Rebecca DiBennardo, Sex Offenders Are Among the Most Harshly Punished
Criminals in the State, But How Often Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?, CTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF WOMEN (Jan. 5, 2017), https://csw.ucla.edu/2017/01/05/sex-offenders-among-harshly-punish
ed-criminals-state-often-punishment-fit-crime/.
4. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That
Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 38 (2010) (discussing how the media attention
surrounding high-profile but rare crimes skews the public's perception toward believing these
crimes occur more often than they do).
5. Ex Post Facto, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (done or made after the fact;
having retroactive force or effect).
6. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VIII, XIV; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824
(1977) (enshrining a constitutional protection of prisoner access to courts, without which, other
constitutional rights would be meaningless).
7. See generally Does # 1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that
current sex offender regulations offend the prohibition against ex post facto laws and noting that
additional constitutional claims are far from frivolous).
8. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
9. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003).
10. Id. at 105-06.
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Smith v. Doe.11 In Hendricks, the Kansas State legislature retroactively
applied a law permitting certain sex offenders to be civilly committed after
they served their prison sentences.12  In Smith, the Alaska legislature
lengthened the time sex offenders were required to register on a sex offender
registry and applied these new requirements on individuals already subject
to existing registration requirements.13 In each case, the majority held these
laws to be civil, nonpunitive regulatory measures and thus, the retroactive
application of these laws, contravening the prohibition against ex post facto
laws, was permitted. 14
In contrast, the dissenting justices in Hendricks and Smith believed that
the relevant sex offender regulation schemes in place in the late 1990s and
early 2000s already constituted an "affirmative restraint" on sex offenders
and should have been declared punitive15 The dissenting justices, believing
sex offender regulations to be punitive, reasoned that criminal constitutional
protections should be extended to these individuals and that retroactive ex
post facto application of these laws should have been prohibited. 16
For more than two decades, constitutional challenges to sex offender
statutes have generally failed because most courts have followed the
precedents set by the United Supreme Court in Hendricks and Smith.1
However, in the years since these decisions, federal and state laws have
become increasingly restrictive on the regulated offender. For example, the
federal government enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act ("SORNA") in 2006, creating a comprehensive sex offender regulation
scheme with which all states are required to comply.18 Since SORNA, states
have not only met the minimum federal requirements, but many have enacted
laws much more restrictive than required.19
11. Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-91; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
12. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351-53.
13. See generally Smith, 538 U.S. 84.
14. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
15. See generally Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Smith, 538 U.S. at
110-18 (Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting) (the relevant regulations included civil confinement
and sex offender registration).
16. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Smith, 538 U.S. at 110-18
(Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting).
17. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (upholding
challenges to sex offender regulations on the ground that the legislatures had a nonpunitive intent).
18. DEP'T OF JUST., SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 1 (2016) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES].
19. DiBennardo, supra note 3; See also JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, Ass'N FOR THE
TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING SEX OFFENDER POLICY
TO PREVENT CHLD SEXUAL ABUSE 21 (2011) (among other things, states have legislated
Summer 2018] SEX OFFENDER REGULATIONS 717
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In 2016 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals revisited the issue in Does
#1-5 v. Snyder.20  In that case, the Sixth Circuit echoed the dissenting
opinions in Hendrix and Smith, and held that Michigan's version of SORNA,
the Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA"), was punitive in nature and
thus, "[the] retroactive application of SORA's 2006 and 2011 amendments
to Plaintiffs is unconstitutional, and it must therefore cease."21  To
distinguish the current set of regulations from the constitutionally upheld
regulatory schemes in Hendricks and Smith, the Snyder court noted that the
sex offender statutes of two decades earlier were far more modest than the
2016 SORA law in Michigan.22 In coming to its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
also relied on empirical studies not available to earlier courts, which
contradicted the assumption that "[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is 'frightening and high." 23 The Sixth Circuit's decision was
appealed, but he Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. With a circuit
court ruling that current sex offender regulations are punitive rather than
nonpunitive, it remains unclear whether future courts will follow suit.
This Note first examines the history of sex offender regulations within
the United States, highlighting how the regulations have become more
restrictive over the last two decades. Next, his Note discusses the rulings of
Hendricks and Smith, and how these cases have set the legal precedent still
followed by a majority of today's courts. Finally, this Note reviews the
recent Sixth Circuit's decision in Does #1-5 v. Snyder, concluding that the
increasing restrictiveness of sex offender regulations, combined with a better
understanding of the dangerousness of convicted offenders, may persuade
future courts to define post-incarceration sex offender regulations as
punitive, and therefore extend to them criminal constitutional protections.
I. The Increasingly Punitive Nature of Sex Offender Regulations
The detrimental effects on individuals, communities, and governments
in implementing our criminal justice system has created a movement towards
limitations to where an offender can live or work, automatic lifetime sex offender registration, and
lifetime GPS monitoring).
20. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
21. Id. at 706.
22. Id. at 700.
23. See id. at 704 (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)); see also Hal Arkowitz and Scott Lilienfeld, Once a Sex
Offender, Always a Sex Offender? Maybe Not., SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 1, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/misunderstood-crimes/. (The authors note that the
common assumption that sex offender recidivism rates are extremely high is inaccurate.




reforming sentencing laws, reinstating judicial discretion, and rehabilitating
convicted criminals.24 However, these trends are not being applied to
individuals convicted of sex crimes.25
During the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures across the nation adopted strict
sentencing laws and embarked on a "prison-building, lock-em-up binge,"26
as a reaction to events such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots and several high-
profile murders.2 7 This had the effect of quadrupling the national prison
population from 500,000 in 1980 to over 2.3 million today.28 This staggering
number translates into the United States housing twenty-five percent of the
world's prisoners, while only having five percent of the world's population.29
In the 2000s, California was operating some prisons at 300% design
capacity, leading the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata to rule that certain
California prisons were violating the constitutional right of inmates to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.30
Because of the overcrowding of correctional facilities across the nation, the
federal government and states like California have been resisting the "lock
'em up" mentality of the past and have introduced legislation to reduce
penalties for certain categories of crimes.31 The general consensus i  that
criminal justice is trending in favor of rehabilitation, granting incentives for
inmates to improve themselves, and encouraging them to refrain from gang
activity and narcotics use.32
24. George Skelton, Old Brown Tries to Fix a Young Brown's Mistake, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-sac-cap-20160201-column.html.
25. See DiBennardo, supra note 3.
26. Skelton, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.naacp.org/criminal-
justice-fact-sheet/.
30. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 522, 545 (2011) ("[t]he medical and mental health care
provided by California's prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eight
Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a remedy
will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.").
31. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE,
CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY NOVEMBER 8, 2016 (2016), http://vig.cdn.sos.
ca.gov/2016/generallen/pdf/complete-vig.pdf (propositions that are designed to reform the criminal
justice system and generally reduce criminal sentencing on the November 8, 2016 ballot included:
Proposition 57 Criminal Sentencing and Juvenile Crime Proceedings; Proposition 62 Repeal of
Death Penalty; Proposition 64 Marijuana Legalization; and Proposition 66 Death Penalty Procedure
Time Limits).
32. Ulloa, supra note 2; see also NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE
FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2016) (congress is currently considering
legislation (e.g., S. 2123, H.R. 3713) that would put into effect some of the policy options discussed
in this report, including expanding the "safety valve" for some low-level offenders, allowing
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Sex crime laws have not followed this trend in criminal justice, rather,
stricter penalties for sex crimes are constantly being introduced.33
"[B]etween 2007 and 2008, no fewer than 1,500 sex offender related bills
were introduced in state legislatures, and over 275 new laws were passed and
enacted."34 For example, recently in California, spurred by the media storm
surrounding the outcome of the Brock Turner rape trial and the Bill Cosby
sexual assault scandal, a host of new sexual assault prevention laws took
effect on January 1, 2017. California Senate Bill 813 removed the statute
of limitations for the prosecution of sexual assault; Assembly Bill 701
broadened the definition of rape to include forced penetration of any body
part with any foreign object; and Assembly Bill 2888 mandated prison time
for convicted rapists.36 The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") has
commented that minority groups and the poor will be most affected by these
laws noting that "those who will bear the brunt of this law will be defendants
",37whose parents can't afford to hire the best attorneys money can buy ....
Despite the warnings, enacting anti-sexual assault legislation has been both
publicly popular and bipartisan.38
While enacting more laws to solve a problem feels good, society must
also consider the fact that sex offenders, as a general group, are already
among the most heavily punished and regulated group of felons.39
Continuing to enhance laws in this area risks violating individual rights,
increasing prison overcrowding, and imposing an additional burden on
members of society who are least able to afford the cost of a legal defense.40
inmates to earn additional good time credit as a part of a risk and needs assessment system, and
reducing mandatory minimum penalties for some offenses).
33. TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 19, at 21.
34. Id.
35. Jazmine Ulloa, Spurred by Brock Turner Case, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Laws to Toughen





39. DiBennardo, supra note 3; Press Release, S.F. District Att'y, Man Found Guilty of
Sexually Assaulting An Unconscious Woman (Nov. 17, 2016), http://sfdistrictattomey.org/man-
found-guilty-sexually-assaulting-unconscious-woman; see also Deanna, Suspect Gets 8 Year
Sentence for Sexual Assault, S.F. NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017) www.thesfnews.com/suspect-gets-8-year-
sentence-sexual-assault/33447 (noting an example of a post-Brock Turner case whereby the





A. The Creation of the National Sex Offender Public Registry
Believing that sex offenders pose an extreme danger to society as a
whole and that traditional criminal justice practices are inadequate to address
the problem, legislatures across the country have enacted civil-regulatory
schemes designed to regulate sex offenders long after their period of
incarceration.4 1 The first national sex offender regulations were enacted to
assist law enforcement with sexual assault investigations by legislatures who
viewed the recidivism of sex offenders as a serious threat to public safety.42
Though states had been haphazardly implementing reporting systems for
certain classes of offenses for decades, Congress first mandated that states
implement a sex offender registry system under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Wetterling Act), as
part of the Omnibus Crime Bill enacted in 1994.43
On October 22, 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling, his brother,
and a friend were riding their bikes home when a masked gunman stopped
the children and kidnapped Jacob.t He was never seen again.45 Due in large
part to the activism of the Wetterling family, Congress passed the Jacob
Wetterling Act, which required states to create registries of offenders
convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes against children and to
establish special requirements for highly dangerous sex offenders known as
"sexually violent predators" ("SVP").46 The Wetterling Act also required
sex offenders to verify their addresses with proper authorities annually for
ten years, and required sexually violent predators to verify their address on
a quarterly basis for life.47 The Wetterling Act allowed each state to decide
what sex offender registry information should be released and it did not
* 48mandate active community notification.
Active community notification was not required until another tragedy
spurred lawmakers to action. In 1994, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl
41. Melissa Hamilton, Constitutional Law and the Role of Scientific Evidence: The
Transformative Potential of Doe v. Snyder 58 B.C. L. REV. 34, 35 (2017).
42. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing LAWRENCE A.
GREENFIELD, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)); Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003).
43. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012).
44. Emily Lee, What is the Wetterling Act? Jacob Wetterling's Legacy Helped Make the
World A Little Safer, ROMPER (Sep. 4, 2016), https://www.romper.com/p/what-is-the-wetterling-
act-jacob-wetterlings-legacy-helped-make-the-world-a-little-safer- 17752.
45. Id.
46. Megan's Law & The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG,
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named Megan Kanka was lured into her neighbor's home, was brutally
sexually assaulted, and then murdered.49 The murderer had been convicted
of sexually assaulting two children in the past.50  The fact that the
neighborhood did not know the murderer's past sexual assault history sparked
community outrage and the Kanka family, along with other advocates, pushed
for what is now known as Megan's Law-a federal amendment o the Jacob
Wetterling Act passed in 1996.1 Megan's Law required all fifty states to
establish publicly accessible websites containing sex offender registration.52
Though states were slow to create online registries, by 2001, twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia had online sex offender registry websites.
Megan's Law greatly increased the accessibility of online information to the
public, but the law left to the states' own discretion which categories of sex
crimes warranted sex offender registration and what types of information to
publish to the national online database.54
In 1996, as an additional amendment to the Wetterling Act, Congress
passed the Pam Lynchner Sexual Offender Trafficking and Identification
Act, which required state law enforcement to transmit sex offender data and
fingerprints to the FBI in order to create a national database of released sex
offenders to track their whereabouts and movement.5 Pam Lynchner was
an activist and victim of an attempted sexual assault. As the president for
Justice for All, an organization founded to advocate for victims of violent
crimes, Ms. Lynchner pushed for a national database to track sex offenders.56
Ms. Lynchner's law required persons convicted of sexual offenses in states
that do not have "minimally sufficient" registration programs to register with
the FBI sex offenders' current address, fingerprints, and current
49. Megan's Law & The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG,




53. Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) at 10
Years: History, Implementation, and the Future, 64 DRAKE L. REv. 741, 751 (2016) (discussing
the history and implications of Megan's Law).
54. Megan's Law & The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG,
https://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/public/meganFederal.html (Jan. 14, 2018).
55. The Pam Lychner Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG, https://www.parentsformegans
law.org/newscategories/newsArticles/General/GIVINGTHEIRLIVESFORLAWS/THEPA
MLYCHNERACT/THEPAMLYCHNERACT (Jan. 14, 2018).
56. Megan's Law & The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG,
https://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/public/meganFederal.html (Jan. 14, 2018).
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photograph.7 The legislation further amended the Jacob Wetterling Act by
changing the duration of state sex offender registration requirements from
"10 years" to "10 years to life," depending on the number of prior
convictions and the type of crime committed.
In the early 2000s, none of the state sex offender registration websites
were integrated or collectively searchable. To address this, Congress passed
the PROTECT Act in 2003, which called for the creation of a national
registry of convicted sex offenders to be managed by the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"). 59 In 2005, the National Sex Offender Public Registry
("NSOPR") went online and by 2006, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had sex offender registry sites that were collectively searchable by
anyone with an internet connection.6 0
B. The Second Generation of National Sex Offender Statutes: SORNA
Spurred to action by the abduction of their son Adam Walsh in 1981,
the Walsh family became extremely active in advocating for additional
legislation aimed at protecting children from sexual predators.61  This
culminated in the signing of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006 by President George W. Bush and included as its Title I, the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). The Act's stated
purpose was "[t]o protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against
children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent offenders."62
SORNA replaced the Jacob Wetterling Act and established new minimum
federal sex offender regulation standards that states are required to adhere to
in order to keep certain federal grant funds.63
The changes between the Jacob Wetterling Act and SORNA were
significant.64 In addition to making it a federal crime for a sex offender to
57. The Pam Lychner Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG, https://www.parentsformegans
law.org/newscategories/newsArticles/General/GIVINGTHEIRLIVESFORLAWS/THEPA
M_LYCHNERACT/THEPAMLYCHNERACT (Jan. 14, 2018).
58. Id.
59. McPherson, supra note 53, at 755.
60. Id.
61. Megan's Law & The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, PARENTSFORMEGANSLAW.ORG,
https://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/public/meganFederal.html (Jan. 14, 2018).
62. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, [hereinafter
Adam Walsh Act] (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2012)).
63. Id.; see also Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 125,
120 Stat. 590, 600-01 (2006).
64. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-130211, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION ACT: JURISDICTIONS FACE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACT, AND
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fail to register, SORNA expanded the covered jurisdictions to include all
federally recognized tribal entities.65 SORNA also increased the number of
covered offenses to include crimes involving sexual contact as well as sexual
acts.6 6 SORNA expanded sex offender registration requirements to include
juvenile offenders over fourteen years old convicted of certain aggravated
sex offenses.67 In addition, SORNA lengthened the minimum sex offender
registration time for Tier I sex offenders to fifteen years, twenty-five years
for Tier II sex offenders, and required lifetime registration for rape and
sexual contact offenses against children.68 SORNA also increased the
number of in-person appearances with authorities, and required an increase
in the number of data points sex offenders must give the authorities to
include DNA samples, fingerprints, palm prints, photograph, internet
handles (emails and social media names), residency information,
employment information and school information.6 9 Finally, SORNA
mandated that states publish almost all information collected by authorities
onto a national sex offender website for public use.70
With amendments, SORNA currently provides comprehensive
minimum standards for states to adhere to when executing a sex offender
regulation program. In 2008, SORNA was amended by the KIDS Act
which required jurisdictions to collect internet identifiers, such as email
STAKEHOLDERS REPORT POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS 8 (2013) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT].
65. Election by Indian Tribes, 42 U.S.C. § 16927 (2006).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) ("the term "sexual act" means- (A) contact between the penis and
the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the
penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the
mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or
genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching,
not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person"); cf 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) ("the term "sexual contact" means the intentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any
person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.")
67. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT, supra note 64, at 8.
68. Id. (The federal SORNA statute envisions a tiered sex offender registration system with
three levels correlating to the amount of mandatory registration time based on the severity and
nature of the offense.).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. McPherson, supra note 53, at 755.
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addresses and social media aliases, from registered sex offenders.72 In 2011,
supplemental guidelines for SORNA were issued requiring that jurisdictions
must collect international travel information from sex offenders to monitor
the tracking of sex offenders who leave the country.73 In 2015, Congress
passed the Military Sex Offender Reporting Act requiring the Department of
Defense to submit registration information about anyone convicted of a sex
crime by a military court to the national sex offender registry databases.74 In
2016, the International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and
Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex
Offenders (known as "IML") was signed into law by President Obama.75
This codified the requirement that sex offenders must provide twenty-one
day advance notice of any international travel or face a criminal violation,
and requires the State Department to mark the passport of anyone required
to register as a sex offender if the victim was a minor.7 6
C. State Sex Offender Statutes: Where SORNA is Silent
SORNA was a significant revision of federal sex offender regulation
and with amendments, is still in effect. Like other laws establishing a set of
federal minimum standards, states are free to enact additional regulatory
measures as they deem necessary. To protect their populations, states have
taken the liberty to enact their own legislation to regulate sex offenders in
areas where SORNA is silent-one area being residency restrictions.7 8 Since
the passage of SORNA, "over 30 states and hundreds of local counties and
municipalities" have adopted restrictions limiting where an offender can live
or work.79 In California for example, Proposition 83 passed in November
2006, known as the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica's
Law, prohibited certain sex offenders from living within 2000 feet of
72. KIDS Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-400, 122 Stat. 422 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901
et seq.).
73. See Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed.
Reg. 1,630 (Jan. 11, 2011).
74. Military Sex Offender Reporting Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, sec. 502(a), §128A
Stat. 227, 258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16928a) (May 29, 2015).
75. See International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes
Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders, Pub. L. No. 114-119 (Feb. 8, 2016).
76. Id.
77. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18.
78. Id. at 13 (SORNA's minimum standards do not address or require residency restrictions
in any way.).
79. Bruce Zucker, Jessica's Law Residency Restrictions in California: The Current State of
the Law, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 101, 101 (2014).
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"schools and parks where children regularly gather."8 0 These prohibitions
severely and immediately restricted where sex offenders were able to live and
contributed to an epidemic of offender homelessness.1 In one of the few
instances where sex offenders have successfully litigated their legal claims,
the California Supreme Court in 2015 ruled that Proposition 83, rather than
being a blanket prohibition, should be followed on a case by case basis.82
Additionally, a number of states have instituted mandatory lifetime
GPS tracking technology for certain classes of sex offenders, and some states
have gone so far as to impose internet usage restrictions on sex offenders
who are no longer in custody.83 Though SORNA envisions a three-tiered
system for sex offender registration based on the nature of the offense,
eighteen states currently register persons convicted of any sex crime for
life. 84 Because of the perceived danger that sex offenders pose to society,
laws governing the lives of sex offenders and enhancing penalties for sex
crimes are constantly being enacted. 85
II. Nonpunitive Sex Offender Laws-When the Constitution
Does Not Apply
Criminal law affords constitutional protections unavailable to
individuals who are regulated pursuant to a civil regulation scheme enacted
to protect the public from harm.86 Thus, the threshold question is whether
these laws are punitive or nonpunitive in nature. To determine whether a
80. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83, §21 (West 2014).
81. In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 1023 (2015) ("Blanket enforcement of the residency
restrictions against these parolees has severely restricted their ability to find housing in compliance
with the statute, greatly increased the incidence of homelessness among them, and hindered their
access to medical treatment, drug and alcohol dependency services, psychological counseling and
other rehabilitative social services available to all parolees, while further hampering the efforts of
parole authorities and law enforcement officials to monitor, supervise, and rehabilitate them in the
interests of public safety. It thus has infringed their liberty and privacy interests, however limited,
while bearing no rational relationship to advancing the state's legitimate goal of protecting children
from sexual predators, and has violated their basic constitutional right to be free of unreasonable,
arbitrary, and oppressive official action.").
82. Id.; see also Kate Mather & Victoria Kim, California Eases Jessica's Law Restrictions
for Some Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.comlocal/crimella-me-
jessica-law-20150327-story.html.
83. Jonathon Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook: The Freedom of Speech
Implications of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Media, 89 IND. L.J. 1327, 1327 (2014).
84. Margaret Love, 50-State Survey of Relief rom Sex Offender Registration, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (May 14, 2015), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/05/14/50-state-
survey-of-relief-provisions-affecting-sex-offender-registration/.
85. TABACHNICK & KLEIN, supra note 19 (In 2007 and 2008 alone, over 1,500 sex offender-
related bills were introduced in state legislatures.).
86. See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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regulation is punitive or nonpunitive, the Supreme Court created a two-part
intent-effects test in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and United States v.
Ward.8 7 The Kansas v. Hendrix and Smith v. Doe courts relied on this test
to come to the conclusion that sex offender regulations are nonpunitive.88
Two decades later, in Does #1-5 v. Snyder, the same test was applied with
opposite results.89 A growing minority of courts are beginning to rule that
these laws are punitive in light of the ever-increasing number and severity of
sex offense laws.90 And as already noted above, "research comparing the
recidivism rates of sex offenders with those of non-sex offenders
consistently finds that sex offenders have lower overall recidivism rates than
non-sex offenders."91
A. Punitive or Nonpunitive, the Intent-Effects Test Legal Standard
To draw a line between punitive and regulatory laws, the Supreme
Court adopted the two-part intent-effects test outlined in United States v.
Ward and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.92 The Court in Ward explains that
if it is deemed that the legislature intended the law to be punishment, the
analysis ends.93 If, however, the intent of the law is ambiguous, then a court
must consider whether the law is so punitive in purpose or effect as to
overcome manifest intent o the contrary.94 That manifest intent will only be
rejected if it can be shown by the "clearest proof that the scheme is so
punitive in purpose or effect as to negate" the legislature's intention to deem
it civil. 95
87. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
88. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 84 (2003);
Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
89. See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2016).
90. See id. at 696; Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d
371 (Ind. 2009); Maine v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011); Starkey v. Okla.
Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (detailing all case law from state courts regarding
retroactive application of sex offender registration and notification statutes).
91. ROGER PRZYBYLSKI, DEP'T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF ADULT SEXUAL OFFENDERS, SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING INITIATIVE (2015) (noting that though sex
offenders are less likely to reoffend in general, they are more likely to commit sex crimes than non-
sex offenders).
92. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69; United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
93. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
94. Id. at 249.
95. Id. at 248-49.
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First, a court must determine whether the legislature meant the statute
to establish a civil regulation. 96 If the legislature's intention was to enact a
civil regulatory scheme that is nonpunitive, courts must then examine
whether the statutory scheme is "so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate
[the State's] intention to deem it civil." 97  Furthermore, because courts
generally defer to the legislature's stated intent, "only the clearest proof will
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." 98
To determine the effect of the regulation, the court then must turn to
seven factors outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. These factors
include: (1) whether the law imposes an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether its
application requires a finding of scienter; (4) whether it promotes the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether it
applies to conduct that is already a crime; (6) whether it can advance
legitimate, nonpunitive purposes; and (7) whether it appears excessive in
relation to the nonpunitive purpose.99 After weighing all the factors, the
court will determine if the effect is in fact punitive or not independent of the
legislatures stated intent.
B. The Supreme Court Precedents: Kansas v. Hendricks and Smith v. Doe
When the Wetterling Act series of federal sex offender regulation
statutes were being implemented in the 1990s and 2000s, they were
retroactively applied to people who had been convicted of sex crimes before
the enactment of these statutes. Because of this retroactive application, the
earliest challenges to sex offender regulations were based on the theory that
the statutes were violating the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of
the Constitution.
Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto
laws-laws that criminalize "an action and simultaneously provides for
punishment of those who took the action before it had legally become a
crime." 100 In other words, ex post facto laws are laws that: (1) punish an
96. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
97. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997));
see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-249.
98. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980))
(citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
99. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3; Ex Post Facto Law, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (Specifically, a law that impermissibly applies retroactively, esp. in a way that negatively
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action that, when committed was lawful; (2) makes a crime more severe than
when it was committed; (3) changes or increases the punishment
retroactively; or (4) alters the rules of evidence from those in effect when the
offense was committed.101 The question whether sex offender registry laws
violate the ex post facto clause of the constitution hinged on whether or not
the sex offender regulations were enacted for a nonpunitive or civil purpose,
or were intended to be punitive.102
The Supreme Court first applied the effects-intent test to a challenge of
a sex offender statute in Kansas v. Hendricks.103  In 1994, the Kansas
Legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA") to manage
repeat sexual offenders by permitting the state to involuntarily civilly
commit them after serving their prison sentence if the offender was deemed
a sexually violent predator ("SVP"). 104 Hendricks, after serving nearly ten
years of his sentence for taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-year-
old boys, was slated for release from prison.105  Shortly before he was
released, the state filed a petition seeking to designate Hendricks as a SVP to
have him involuntarily committed to civil confinement.106  Hendricks
challenged his civil commitment under the new SVPA on constitutional due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds.1 0 7 The Kansas Supreme
Court determined that the state violated Hendricks' constitutional due process
rights because the SVPA's definition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy
the "mental illness" requirement in the civil commitment context.108 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the SVPA satisfied constitutional due
process because Kansas's use of "mental abnormality" did satisfy the "mental
illness" requirement needed for civil commitment. 109
The Court then moved on to apply the intent-effects test to determine
whether or not the SVPA was punitive-the key question as to whether a
double jeopardy or ex post facto violation had occurred.10 The Court found
affects a person's rights, as by making into a crime an action that was legal when it was committed
or increasing the punishment for past conduct.).
101. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798).
102. See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
(2003).
103. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
104. Id. at 351-53.
105. Id. at 353-54.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 356.
108. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
109. Id. at 358.
110. Id. at 361.
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that the first step of the intent-effects test was satisfied because "nothing on
the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything
other than a civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public from
harm."1 In looking at the effect, whether the statute was so punitive as to
negate the legislatures intent, the Court examined the SVPA utilizing the
Mendoza-Martinez factors.112  Though the Court found that the civil
commitment scheme involved an affirmative restraint, that alone was not
enough to "lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed
punishment."1 3 Thus, the Court held that civil commitment is consistent
with the historic nonpunitive practice of confining "mentally unstable
individuals," including persons adjudicated as sexually violent predators.114
The Court further explained that the SVPA did not implicate retribution or
deterrence, two primary objectives of criminal punishment.15 Because of a
lack of punitive effect or intent, the Court concluded that the SVPA was
nonpunitive and thus removed "an essential prerequisite" for Hendrick's
double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.116
The dissent, in which four justices took part, also used the Mendoza-
Martinez factors as a guide.117 It argued that the registration scheme was an
ex post facto law and did apply to Hendricks because the SVPA failed the
effect portion of the intent-effects test and was therefore punitive.18 First,
they noted that the act resembles punishment because incapacitation is "one
important purpose of criminal punishment."1 9  The SVPA imposed
confinement through the use of persons, procedural guarantees, and
standards traditionally associated with criminal law and did so only on a
person who has committed a prior crime.120 In addition, the act applied only
to people who have served their original sentence and does not contemplate
evaluation or treatment until after they have served their entire criminal
sentence.12 1 Further, the statute did not require the committing authority to
111. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
112. Id. at 362-66.
113. Id. at 363.
114. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987)).
115. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.
116. Id. at 369.
117. Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, J.J., in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined as to Parts II and III).
118. Id. at 379.
119. Id.
120. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 380, 385.
121. Id. at 385.
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consider using less restrictive alternatives to confinement. 122 The dissent
concluded that because confinement without treatment is facially punitive,
and that the passage of the SVPA retroactively applied to the 1984 conviction
of Hendricks, the ex post facto clause should apply a constitutional limit in
this case.123
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down another ex post facto
challenge for a sex offender registration statute. Relying heavily on the
reasoning in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court found that sex offender
registration itself, not civil confinement, was nonpunitive and thus did not
implicate the ex post facto clause.124 Passed in 1994, the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act ("ASORA") required sex offenders to register
with law enforcement and made detailed information about the offender
available to the public on the internet. 125 The petitioners challenged the
retroactive application of the statute under the ex post facto clause.126 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska granted the offenders summary
judgment, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed finding that the statute was punitive
despite the legislative intent, thus the ex post facto clause applied. 127
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
again looking to the Mendoza-Martinez factors to analyze whether the effect
of the law was so punitive as to override the legislative intent.128 The
offenders argued that the registration statute resembled the historic
punishment of public shaming, but the Court noted that "even punishments
that lacked the corporal component, such as public shaming, humiliation, and
banishment, involved more than the dissemination of information."1 29 The
Court determined that ASORA was simply the dissemination of information
and concluded that, "[o]ur system does not treat dissemination of truthful
information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as
punishment."1 30 Next, the Court determined that because ASORA imposes
no "affirmative disability or restraint" on the offender, sex offender
registration does not resemble imprisonment.13 1 Finally, the Court reasoned
that the most significant factor is whether the Act is connected to a
122. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 380, 387.
123. Id. at 380, 395.
124. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96 (2003).
125. Id. at 91.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 91-92.
128. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 97.
129. Id. at 99.
130. Id. at 98-99.
131. Id. at 100.
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nonpunitive purpose and found that it was intimately connected with the
legislatures desire to protect public safety.132 Because the Court found the
law's intent and effect were nonpunitive, the retroactive application of
ASORA was upheld.13 3
Dissenting, Justice Stevens reasoned that ASORA's effect was punitive
in nature because it failed the effects portion of the intent-effects test.134
Justice Stevens looked at the liberty interests implicated in the registration
scheme and argued that the "statute impose[s] significant affirmative
obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply," and
drew a parallel to reporting duties imposed on criminals during periods of
supervised release or parole.135 In addition to the restriction of a liberty interest,
Justice Sevens noted that these sanctions are imposed on everyone who is
convicted of a relevant criminal offense and are imposed only on those criminals
thus, creating a "sufficient and necessary condition for the sanction."1 36 For
these reasons, Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's majority and would
have held that ASORA was punitive, and thus constitutional limits to post-
incarceration sex offender regulations should apply. 137
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer also dissented, further adding that
the effect of ASORA constituted punishment because of the law's
"excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose."1 38 They argued that
sex offender registration was similar to the historical punishment of shaming
because "it exposes registrants, through aggressive public notification of
their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism."139
They also explained that ASORA was excessive because its sanctions were
not applied based on a finding of future dangerousness, or to an offenders
risk of reoffending, but to whether the conviction was aggravated in some
way.140 Finally, they argued that ASORA constituted punishment because
once convicted, no matter that the offender was rehabilitated or rendered
harmless by physical incapacitation, there was no way for an offender to be
removed from the registry and "he will remain subject to long-term
monitoring and inescapable humiliation."141
132. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
133. Id. at 105-106.
134. Id. at 110-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Smith, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 115 (Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 116-17 (Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., dissenting).
732 [Vol. 45:4
SEX OFFENDER REGULATIONS
Despite the concerns raised by dissenting Justices, Kansas v. Hendricks
and Smith v. Doe remain law in 2018. Because sex offender regulation
statutes remain nonpunitive in nature, states are free to restrict sex offenders
in ways that would be constitutionally impermissible if applied to almost any
other group of people.
C. An Opportunity for Change? Does #1-5 v. Snyder
After Kansas v. Hendricks and Smith v. Doe, the issue of whether sex
offender regulations were punitive or civil was settled. As of 2018, state
courts have generally followed the Supreme Court's lead and held that their
respective state's sex offender statutes are nonpunitive.142 However, seven
state supreme courts have found that the retroactive application of sex
offender registration laws violated their state constitutions.143  In one
142. See McPherson, supra note 53, at 778 (noting in n. 211 that the following cases hold sex
offender regulations to be civil rather than punitive); see, e.g., Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1041
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); In re Alva, 92
P.3d 311, 313 (Cal. 2004); People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Colo. App. 2009); State v.
Waterman, 825 A.2d 63, 70-71 (Conn. 2003); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 435 (D.C. 2004); Givens
v. State, 851 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Frazier v. State, 668 S.E.2d 646, 647 (Ga.
2008); State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 255 (Haw. 2004); State v. Gragg, 137 P.3d 461, 463 (Idaho
2005); People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 301 (Ill. 2004); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W. 2d 396,
400 (Iowa 1997); State v. Petersen-Beard, 2016 Kan. LEXIS 241 (Apr. 22, 2016); Buck v.
Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Ky. 2010); Smith v. State, 84 So. 3d 487, 498 (La. 2012);
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 305 n.14 (Mass. 2008); People v. Golba, 729
N.W.2d 916,924-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. 1995);
Garrison v. State, 950 So. 2d 990, 992-93 (Miss. 2006); Doe v. Lee, No. ED 90404, 2009 WL
21097, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009), sustained and cause ordered transferred (Mar. 30, 2009),
retransferred, (Sept. 1, 2009), opinion on retransfer, 296 S.W.3d 498 (2009); State v. Mount, 78
P.3d 829, 835 (Mont. 2003); State v. Harris, 817 N.W.2d 258, 273 (Neb. 2012); State v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 306 P.3d 369, 385 (Nev. 2013); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533 (N.H.
1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 388 (N.J. 1995); State v. Druktenis, 86 P.3d 1050, 1059 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2004); Doe v. Div. of Prob. & Corr. Alts., 654 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (Sup. Ct. 1997); State
v. Sakobie, 598 S.E.2d 615, 618 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147, 152 (N.D.
1999); State v. MacNab, 51 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Or. 2012) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Lee, 935
A.2d 865, 877 (Pa. 2007); State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009); State v. Walls, 558
S.E.2d 524, 526 (S.C. 2002); Meinders v. Weber, 604 N.W.2d 248, 255-56 (S.D. 2000); State v.
Gibson, No. E2003-02102-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2827000, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 9,
2004); Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69-70 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Briggs, 199
P.3d 935, 943-44 (Utah 2008); State v. Thompson, 807 A.2d 454, 459 n.3 (Vt. 2002); Kitze v.
Commonwealth, 475 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1068
(Wash. 1994) (en banc); Hensler v. Cross, 558 S.E.2d 330, 335 (W. Va. 2001); State v. Sturdevant,
No. 2006AP3185, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1055, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2008); Kammerer
v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 832 (Wyo. 2014).
143. In reverse chronological order, the states are Oklahoma, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, Maine,
Alaska, and Missouri. See Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1035-36 (Okla. 2013)
(detailing all case law from state courts regarding retroactive application of sex offender
registration and notification statutes); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123,
149 (Md. 2013); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011); Wallace v. State, 905
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confusing day in 2016, two contradicting opinions came out of the Supreme
Court of Kansas. Doe v. Thompson held that the Kansas sex registration
statute was punishment, and thus, violated the ex post facto clause, while
State v. Petersen-Beard overruled the first case, holding the opposite.144
Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court has declined to revisit the ex post
facto question on at least five occasions.145
Despite the lack of enthusiasm most courts seem to have about
protecting the constitutional rights of sex offenders, the Sixth Circuit
reignited the debate by deciding Does #1-5 v. Snyder.146 In this case, the
plaintiffs (sex offenders) challenged Michigan's Sex Offender Registry Act
("SORA"), arguing that the amendments to SORA, specifically after 2006,
violated their constitutional rights. 147 Despite long-standing precedent, the
Sixth Circuit determined that SORA was a punitive statute and thus, criminal
constitutional protections apply to sex offenders.148 In making its decision,
the Sixth Circuit took note of two important factual changes since the
Supreme Court decided Hendricks and Smith: First, they noted that SORA
was far more restrictive than earlier registration schemes; and second, they
pointed out that scientific studies suggest that sex offenders might not be as
dangerous to the public previously thought.149 The court then analyzed the
ex post facto implications of SORA through the intent-effects test and
generally followed the Mendoza-Martinez factors by asking five
questions:150 (1) does the law inflict what has been regarded in our history
and traditions as punishment?;15 1 (2) does it impose an affirmative disability
N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 31 (Me. 2009); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d
999, 1019 (Alaska 2008) (same plaintiff as in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)); Missouri's case,
Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (has subsequently been rendered moot); Doe
v. Lee, 2009 WL 21097, at *4.
144. Doe v. Thompson, 373 P.3d 750 (2016) (holding that KORA was punitive and thus
violated the ex post facto clause) overruled by State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016)
(holding that KORA was civil in nature).
145. See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (certiorari denied in 2017); United
States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) (assuming without deciding that Congress did not violate
the ex post facto clause in enacting SORNA's registration requirements); United States v. Juvenile
Male, 564 U.S. 932 (2011) (declining to address whether SORNA's requirements violated the ex
post facto clause on grounds of mootness); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (declining
to address the issue of whether SORNA violates the ex post facto clause).
146. See generally Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704 (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, RECIDIVISM
OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)).
150. Id. at 701.
151. Id.
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or restraint?;152 (3) does it promote the traditional aims of punishment?;153
(4) does it have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose?;154 and (5)
is it excessive with respect to this purpose?155
In answering the first question, the Sixth Circuit found that "while
SORA is not identical to any traditional punishments, it meets the general
definition of punishment, has much in common with banishment and public
shaming, and has a number of similarities to parole/probation."1 56 With
regards to "affirmative disability or restraint" the court recognized that
SORA's provisions are more onerous than those in Smith v. Doe and pointed
out that even though "no one is actually being lugged off in cold irons[,"
SORA puts direct restraints on personal conduct.157 In answering the third
question, the court noted that new studies have shown that SORA does not
appear to prevent recidivism, and that "SORA advances all the traditional
aims of punishment."158  In analyzing whether SORA had a rational
relationship to a nonpunitive purpose, the court cited a study suggesting that
the Act does not actually reduce recidivism, the law's stated purpose for
being.159 It noted that SORA might actually increase offender recidivism
because it makes it "hard for registrants to get and keep a job, find housing,
and reintegrate into their communities."160 This is of particular importance
because the court here used empirical scientific evidence to rebut the
presumption decision-makers have held for decades: that "sex offenders pose
an extreme risk to the public, one that criminal sanctions fail to sufficiently
thwart."1 61 In answering the fifth question, the court argued that the restraints
the statute imposes are not outweighed by positive effects, and that the
"punitive effects of these blanket restrictions thus far exceed even a generous
152. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704 (citing LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, RECIDIVISM
OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 696, 701.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 703
158. Id. at 704.
159. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704. See also PRZYBYLSKI, supra note 91. (Recap of
recent scientific research into the dangerousness of sex offenders concludes that the recidivism of
sex offenders is difficult to measure but, there is indication that sex offenders, although more likely
to commit sex crimes than other criminals, generally reoffend less than other convicted persons.).
160. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016).
161. Melissa Hamilton, Constitutional Law and the Role of Scientific Evidence: The
Transformative Potential of Doe v. Snyder, 58 B.C. L. REV. E-Supplement 34 (2017).
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assessment of their salutary effects."1 62 The Snyder court concluded the ex
post facto question by opining that:
A regulatory regime that severely restricts where people can live,
work, and "loiter," that categorizes them into tiers ostensibly
corresponding to present dangerousness without any individualized
assessment thereof, and that requires time-consuming and
cumbersome in-person reporting, all supported by-at best-scant
evidence that such restrictions serve the professed purpose of keeping
Michigan communities safe, is something altogether different from
and more troubling than Alaska's first generation registry law. SORA
brands registrants as moral lepers solely on the basis of a prior
conviction. It consigns them to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on
the margins, not only of society, but often, as the record in this case
makes painfully evident, from their own families, with whom, due to
school zone restrictions, they may not even live. It directly regulates
where registrants may go in their daily lives and compels them to
interrupt those lives with great frequency in order to appear in person
before law enforcement to report even minor changes to their
information. We conclude that Michigan's SORA imposes
punishment. And while many (certainly not all) sex offenses involve
abominable, almost unspeakable, conduct that deserves severe legal
penalties, punishment may never be retroactively imposed or
increased. 163
In reversing the district court's ruling on ex post facto grounds, the
Sixth Circuit declined to address the plaintiffs' other constitutional bases for
challenging SORA, which included vagueness, free speech under the First
Amendment, and restrictions on work and travel under the Fourteenth
Amendment.164 However, the Sixth Circuit recognized that these challenges
are "far from frivolous and involve matters of great public importance."165
In this case, the Sixth Circuit recognized that sex offender regulations
as of 2016 are vastly more restrictive than they were in 1997 and 2003 when
Hendricks and Smith were decided, and that sex offenders might not be as
dangerous as previously thought. The Supreme Court declined to grant
certiorari to Does #1-5 v. Snyder; however, it is unclear whether the
changing factual situation regarding the restrictiveness of sex offender
regulations and offenders actual rate of recidivism will sway future courts.
162. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016).
163. Id. at 705-06.





Sexual crimes often involve unspeakable acts and should be severely
punished. However, as a society based on the rule of law, we need to ensure
that everyone is granted meaningful constitutional protections. Under the
current system, when a state imposes a registry requirement on a sex offender,
and the terms of that requirement are later increased by a subsequent law, the
ex post facto imposition of additional restrictions does not violate the
constitution. The offender must accept the new regulation even if it means, as
in some states, that the offender will never have any hope of getting off the
registry in his or her lifetime. Ignoring the constitutional protections afforded
to criminals by labeling post-incarceration sex offender regulations as civil,
rather than punitive, circumvents the rights of the convicted.
As discussed, governments rationalize sex offender regulations by
asserting that these laws are necessary to protect the public, and "[c]ourts
have mostly rubberstamped this assertion without paying much heed to
whether the presumption of future dangerousness is factually accurate."1 66
In Hendricks and Smith, both courts relied on the intent-effects test as well
as deferred to the legislature's perception that sex offenders are extremely
dangerous to uphold their rulings. Since these cases were decided, however,
additional research has questioned the decades-old assumption that sex
offenders are more dangerous and recidivistic than other convicts. 167
To protect the constitutional rights of sex offenders, I would first encourage
legislatures to enact appropriate punitive post-incarceration regulation schemes
for those who commit sex crimes to enable individuals regulated by these laws
access to criminal constitutional protections. For example, the sex offender
registration requirements could be part of the convict's probation. This would
give those convicted of sex crimes certainty about the requirements of their
sentence because future laws would not apply retroactively.
Second, to further reduce the dangerousness of these criminals,
counseling and therapy resources should to be made available to sex
offenders while incarcerated.168 Though there is some debate about whether
sex offenders are truly mentally ill, therapeutic treatments have been shown
166. Hamilton, supra note 161, at 36 (arguing that Judges who ignore recent scientific
evidence that ends to show that sex offenders are not a "singular and exceptional" group that poses
a higher than average danger to society are "complicit in perpetuating unnecessary, unfair, and
arbitrary laws that negatively impede upon the lives of individuals to whom they apply").
167. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705; see also Przybylski, supra note 88.
168. PRZYBYLSKI, supra note 91. (concluding that "the evidence suggests that that treatment
for sex offenders-particularly cognitive-behavioral/relapse prevention approaches-can produce
reductions in both sexual and nonsexual recidivism").
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to meaningfully decrease the chance convicted sex offenders commit future
sex crimes.169
Lastly, because rehabilitation is one of the aims of our criminal justice
system, society should reserve imposing automatic lifetime sex offender
registration requirements for the most heinous classes of sex crimes,
allowing the majority of offenders to eventually reintegrate into society
without the stigma of being on a public, searchable, online database.
Nothing in this Note should be construed as defending the actions of
those who commit sex crimes. Sex offences are extremely serious in nature,
and the perpetrators of such acts must be punished accordingly. However,
whatever punishment society deems just must be enacted as such, and not
enacted as a civil regulatory measure to contravene our Constitution. As
Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 44, "as dangerous as it may
be not to punish someone, it is far more dangerous to permit the government
under guise of civil regulation to punish people without prior notice ...
[because] such lawmaking has 'been, in all ages, [a] favorite and most
formidable instrument[] of tyranny."'170 The protections the constitution
preserves, even for criminals, cannot be compromised or circumvented.
Though convicted sex offenders have committed terrible offenses, if our
society continues to regulate offenders' post-incarceration lives to the degree
we currently do, future courts and lawmakers must recognize these
regulations are punitive, and thus afford individuals commensurate
constitutional rights.
169. PRZYBYLSKI, supra note 91.
170. Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER,
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 84 512 (1961)).
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